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Highlights
The euro area today consists of a competitive, moderately leveraged
North and an uncompetitive, over-indebted South. Its main macroe-
conomic challenge is to carry out the adjustment required to restore
the competitiveness of its southern part and eliminate its excessive
public and private debt burden. This paper investigates the relation-
ship between fiscal and competitiveness adjustment in a stylised
model with two countries in a monetary union, North and South. To
restore competitiveness, South implements a more restrictive fiscal
policy than North.
We consider two scenarios. In the first, monetary policy aims at kee-
ping inflation constant in the North. The South therefore needs to de-
flate to regain competitiveness, which worsens the debt dynamics. In
the second, monetary policy aims at keeping inflation constant in the
monetary union as a whole. This results in more monetary stimulus,
inflation in the North is higher, and this in turn helps the debt dyna-
mics in the South.
Our main findings are:        
• The differential fiscal stance between North and South is what
determines real exchange rate changes. South therefore needs to
tighten more. There is no escape from relative austerity. 
• If monetary policy aims at keeping inflation stable in the North and
the initial debt is above a certain threshold, debt dynamics are
perverse: fiscal retrenchment is self-defeating;
• If monetary policy targets average inflation instead, which implies
higher inflation in the North, the initial debt threshold above which
the debt dynamics become perverse is higher. Accepting more
inflation at home is therefore a way for the North to contribute to
restoring debt sustainability in the South. 
• Structural reforms in the South improve the debt dynamics if the
initial debt is not too high. Again, targeting average inflation rather
than inflation in the North helps strengthen the favourable effects
of structural reforms.
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1 Introduction1
The euro area today consists of a competitive, moderately leveraged North and an uncompetitive,over-
indebted South2 . Its main macroeconomic challenge is to carry out the adjustment required to
restore the competitiveness of its Southern part and eliminate the excessive public and private
debt burden it suffers from.
This is bound to be a very demanding process, not only because adjusting without the nominal
exchange rate is notoriously difﬁcult, but also because there is an intrinsic contradiction between
the competitiveness and deleveraging aims. Simply put, real exchange rate adjustment within a
monetary union can only take place through relative deﬂation, but deﬂation increases the debt
burden and puts solvency at risk. It is a sort of ‘doomed if you do, doomed if you don’t’ challenge:
without real exchange rate adjustment, Southern countries have no hope to return to sustainable
growth and generate the income they need to repay their debts; but the very process of eliminating
the real exchange-rate misalignment endangers public and private deleveraging.
In abstracto the problem does not seem to be without solution. What determines the evolution
of the real exchange rate between North and South is only relative inﬂation, whereas it is absolute
inﬂation that, alongside growth, affects debt sustainability. From a social planner’s perspective the
challenge is to choose both relative and absolute inﬂation optimally. In this respect inﬂation in the
North is a variable of paramount importance.
This reading of the euro-area macroeconomic challenges emphasises interdependence be-
tween North and South. However, adjustment in the Southern part of the euro area has so far
not been envisaged in this way. Rather, it is very much a one-sided process. Macroeconomic
adjustment goals have been assigned to Southern deﬁcit countries, either within the framework of
macro-ﬁnancial assistance packages (for Greece, Portugal and Ireland) or through standard EU
surveillance procedures (for Spain and Italy), but no such goals have been assigned to Northern
European countries. The implicit assumption behind this approach is that budgetary adjustment in
Southern Europe will deliver both ﬁscal sustainability and a return to competitiveness, without the
North having to deviate from its preferred policy course.
Increasingly however, it is realised that competitiveness is a relative concept and that economic
conditions in the North affect the adjustment process in the South. Important indications of a
new stance were declarations by German Finance Minister Wolfgang Scha¨uble 3 and a widely
noted evidence to parliament by the Bundesbank chief economist Jens Ulbrich who said that in
a scenario where Southern Europe would regain competitiveness, ”Germany could in the future
have an inﬂation rate somewhat above the average within the European monetary union, although
monetary policy will have to ensure that inﬂation overall in the EMU is consistent with the goal of
price stability and that inﬂation expectations remain ﬁrmly anchored”4 .
1We are grateful to Zsolt Darvas and Guntram Wolff for detailed comments on an earlier version of this paper. The usual
disclaimer applies
2Detailed empirical evidence supporting this claim is presented in Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012)
3http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/54aa8246-9772-11e1-83f3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz21eQQxCKM
4FT - 9th May 2012 : ”Bundesbank signals softening on inﬂation”
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Against this background, this paper investigates the relationship between ﬁscal and competi-
tiveness adjustment. We start from a stylised model with two countries in a monetary union, North
and South, and consider medium-term adjustments. The initial conditions are that North is un-
dervalued in real terms with respect to South. To correct this misalignment, South implements a
more restrictive ﬁscal policy than North (ﬁscal policy is restrictive in both countries, as both have
to restore the sustainability of public ﬁnances, but South tightens more).
We consider two scenarios. In the ﬁrst one monetary policy aims at keeping inﬂation constant
in the North. The South therefore needs to deﬂate to regain competitiveness. This worsens the
dynamics of its public debt, opening the question of whether ﬁscal adjustment undertaken in this
context can ultimately be self-defeating. In the second scenario monetary policy aims at keeping
inﬂation constant in the monetary union as a whole. This results therefore into more monetary
stimulus, inﬂation in the North is higher, and this in turn helps the debt dynamics in the South.
To keep the model simple, we consider public debt only in the model, though the logic is the
same for private debt. This avoids representing explicitly the budget constraint of the private sec-
tor. Also, we assume that governments have only one instrument at their disposal, namely ﬁscal
policy, and that South assigns it to competitiveness as it cannot act through other means such as
wage, tax or structural policies. The implication is that ”austerity” is driven by real exchange-rate
objectives rather than by sustainability concerns only (or in other words that competitiveness is the
most binding constraint).
One may dispute whether this assignment is a realistic one. We posit it is to a large extent. First,
it is true that governments have other instruments at their disposal, including structural reforms,
but at a few years’ horizon real exchange-rate realignment still takes place along a Phillips curve.
Structural reforms may help increase the responsiveness of wages to labour market conditions (we
consider such effects below) but in the short- to medium-run they merely augment the impact of
macroeconomic policy. Second, competitiveness remains in most Southern European countries a
binding constraint. Indeed a striking characteristic of the current euro-area situation is that relative
prices are far from having adjusted in response to uneven economic conditions (Wolff, 2012). This
is a major reason why policymakers in the EU are reluctant to relax the budgetary objectives set
to Southern European countries.
3
2 Set-up
The economy consists of two countries of unequal size, North (N) and South (S). Initially South is
uncompetitive with respect to North, so it needs to devalue in real terms over the medium term.
For countries that start from a severe misalignment position, the time horizon for the correction is
likely to be of the order of magnitude of 5 years. Here, however, we concentrate on the short-term
effect of the the adjustment, considering a period (T) of 2 years. This focus is admittedly partial,
but the short term effects of adjustment under different conditions is an interesting issue to look at
in the context of the euro area, where distressed countries are initiating this process.
Variables
B public debt (b, debt-to-GDP ratio)
D primary public deﬁcit (d, deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio)
S primary structural deﬁcit (s, deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio)
F net foreign assets (f, NFA-to-GDP ratio)
P price level (π, inﬂation; p, log level)
Q real exchange rate relative to the other country
(increase denotes appreciation) ; (q, log level)
X net exports (CA less investment income; x, CA-to-GDP ratio)
Y output (g, growth rate in real terms; y, log level)
i nominal interest rate (monetary policy rate)
r real interest rate (short term)
j nominal bond rate
The baseline level of variable Z at time T is denoted ZT . Log levels are in lower cases and log
differences are represented as
·
zT = zT − zT .Superscripts i = n; s indicate the 2 countries.
Accounting Equations
·
qs,T =
·
ps,T −
·
pn,T ;
·
qn,T = −
·
qs,T (A1)
Bi,,T = Bi,0(1 + j) +Di,T (A2)
Equation (A1) simply deﬁnes the real exchange rate. Equation A2 is the standard public debt
accumulation equation.
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Reduced-form equations
·
yi,T= −εi
·
qi,T+φ
·
si,T − ψ ·ri,T (1)
·
pi,T= γi
·
yi,T (2)
·
di,T=
·
si,T−δ ·yi,T (3)
Equation (1) gives the products market equilibrium, equation (2) is a reduced Phillips curve and
equation (3) gives the budget deﬁcit as a function of the ﬁscal impulse and automatic stabilisers.
We allow for the parameters γ (Phillips curve coefﬁcient) and ε (elasticity of output with respect to
the real exchange rate) to differ across countries.
The two countries are part of a monetary union (EA), where monetary policy is decided by
a common central bank. The two countries therefore face the same nominal interest rate iE but
given the existence of inﬂation differentials, their real interest rates will differ. Real interest rate in
region i will therefore be:
·
ri,T =
·
iE,T − ·pi,T (4)
The nominal interest rate is decided by the central bank looking at the aggregate product mar-
ket equilibrium, which comes from the aggregation of ys,T and yn,T with weights α and (1− α)
respectively.
Recalling that
·
qs,T = − ·qn,T , it is possible to write the product market equilibrium for the aggre-
gate EA as :
·
yE,T= α
·
ys,T+(1− α)
·
yn,T= − [αεs − (1− α)εn]
·
qs,T+φ
·
sE,T − ψ ·rE,T (5)
where
·
rE,T = α
·
rs,T + (1− α) ·rn,T =
·
iE,T − α ·ps,T − (1− α)
·
pn,T =
·
iE,T − ·pE,T
and
·
sE,T =
[
α
·
ss,T + (1− α) ·sn,T
]
5
The parameter φ in equation (1) gives the response of output to ﬁscal impulses (constant
interest-rat multiplier) and ψ is the semi-elasticity of output to real interest rate changes. For
simplicity we assume the same φ and ψ for both North and South. For real exchange rate changes
within the area not to affect aggregate output, the following relation must hold:
[αεs − (1− α)εn] = 0 (6)
This constraint can be interpreted as imposing that price elasticity of trade within the area are
identical and trade shares inversely proportional to the size of the economy. Imposing (5) implies
that aggregate output is a function of the aggregate ﬁscal stance and the aggregate real interest
rate:
·
yE,T= φ
·
sE,T − ψ ·rE,T (7)
Note that the area-wide nominal interest rate translates into different real interest rates, de-
pending on countries’ inﬂation rate. The real interest rate ultimately depends on the real exchange
rate::
·
rs,T =
·
iE,T − ·ps,T =
·
rE,T + (
·
pE,T −
·
ps,T ) =
·
rE,T − (1− α) ·qs,T
·
rn,T =
·
rE,T − α ·qn,T =
·
rE,T + α
·
qs,T
3 Two Scenarios
Imagine that by the time (T ), South needs to achieve a certain competitiveness adjustment, the
magnitude of which can be derived in different ways from external balance constraints. Assume
the competitiveness adjustment has to be delivered through the only instrument the country has
full control on - ﬁscal policy.In what follows we investigate how ﬁscal consolidation impacts com-
petitiveness on one hand and the debt dynamics on the other hand under two different scenarios.
The ﬁrst scenario is one in which monetary policy targets price stability in the North, and the ad-
justment in the South is a one-sided process. Under the second scenario instead the central bank
targets price stability in the area as a whole. Given that South needs to depreciate relatively to
North, the second scenario implies appreciation in North that helps the process of rebalancing.
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3.1 Monetary Policy
Assume that monetary policy aims at keeping inﬂation constant in the North, meaning
·
pn,T = 0
and consequently
·
qs,T =
·
ps,T . Stable inﬂation in the North implies:
·
pn,T = γn,T
·
yn,T = γn,T
[
−εn ·qn,T + φ
·
sn,T − ψ
( ·
rE,T − α ·qn,T
)]
= 0
Solving for
·
rE,T the expression above, we can derive the area-wide real interest rate as a func-
tion of prices and ﬁscal stance in the North.
·
rE,T =
φ
ψ
·
sn,T +
αψ−εn
ψ
·
qn,T (8)
and the nominal interest, considering that rate is
·
qn,T = −
·
qs,T :
·
iE,T =
·
rE,T +
·
pE,T =
·
rE,T + α
·
ps,T =
φ
ψ
·
sn,T +
εn
ψ
·
qs,T
If monetary policy instead targets price stability for the area as a whole, the interest rate can be
easily derived from the aggregate product market equilibrium and it corresponds to the rate that
keeps output at potential, given an overall ﬁscal stance. Given that average inﬂation is equal to
zero by deﬁnition under this scenario, nominal and real interest rates coincide.
·
yE,T= φ
·
sE,T − ψ ·rE,T = 0 ⇒ ·rE,T = φ
ψ
·
sE,T =
·
iE,T (as
·
pE,T= 0) (9)
3.2 Fiscal Adjustment
The budgetary adjustment that South needs to implement to achieve a given competitiveness
adjustment can be derived from its product market equilibrium:
·
ys,T=
·
ps,T
γs
= −εs ·qs,T+φ
·
ss,T − ψ ·rs,T
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Under the ﬁrst scenario - with monetary policy targeting
·
pn,T = 0 - the real interest rate in South
is:
·
rs,T =
·
iE,T − ·ps,T =
φ
ψ
·
sn,T −
(
1− εn
ψ
)
·
qs,T
Substituting this into the product market equilibrium and solving for the South’s ﬁscal stance
we get a positive relationship between the real exchange rate adjustment and the required relative
ﬁscal adjustment. Expression (10) tells us that the differential ﬁscal adjustment South has to
implement depends on the required real exchange rate correction. In other words ﬁscal policy
in the North is assigned to debt sustainability whereas ﬁscal policy in the South is assigned to
restoring competitiveness.
·
ss,T − ·sn,T = 1 + γs (εs + εn)− ψγs
γsφ
·
qs,T (10)
In the second scenario, with the central bank targeting average inﬂation, the real interest rate
in South is now a function of the aggregate ﬁscal stance:
·
rs,T =
·
iE,T − ·ps,T =
φ
ψ
·
sE,T− ·ps,T =
φ
ψ
(α
·
ss,T + (1− α) ·sn,T )− ·ps,T
Substituting this real interest rate into the the product market equilibrium and recalling that⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
·
qs,T =
·
ps,T −
·
pn,T
·
pE,T = α
·
ps,T + (1− α)
·
pn,T = 0
⇒ ·ps,T=(1− α)
·
qs,T
We can then express the budgetary adjustment as function of
·
qs,T . Again, the relationship
between competitiveness adjustment and ﬁscal adjustment is positive:
·
ss,T − ·sn,T = (1− α) (1− ψγs) + γsεs
γsφ (1− α)
·
qs,T (11)
If we set [αεs − (1− α) εn] = 0 (as assumed) the two expressions found in (10) and (11) are
the same, meaning that inﬂation in the North has no effect on the ﬁscal adjustment required in the
South for a given competitiveness adjustment.
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3.3 Debt Dynamics
We now turn to the analysis of debt dynamics in the South to understand the effects of ﬁscal re-
trenchment and real exchange rate adjustment. The direct effect of adjustment is that it reduces
the budgetary deﬁcit and thereby public debt. However it also reduces domestic output and inﬂa-
tion, which exert a negative effect on the debt dynamics. The ﬁnal result will depend on the relative
magnitude of the two effects.
We again make the distinction beetween the two scenarios presented in section 3. Even though
the budgetary retrenchment needed is the same under the two scenario, debt dynamics differ.
The debt dynamics in the South is described by:
bs,T − bs,0 = (j − gs,T − πs,T )bs,0 + ds,T
Taking differences from the baseline yields:
·
bs,T = −
[ ·
ys,T +
·
ps,T
]
bs,0+
·
ds,T = −
[ ·
ys,T +
·
ps,T
]
bs,0 +
·
ss,T − δ ·ys,T (12)
Under the ﬁrst scenario (
·
pn,T = 0), if we substitute the expression for
·
ss,T derived in (10) into
(12) and recall that
·
ps,T =
·
qs,T we get:
·
bs,T = −
[
1
γs
+ 1
]
bs,0
·
qs,T +
[
1− ψγs
γsφ
+
εs + εn
φ
− δ
γs
]
·
qs,T +
·
sn,T
now recalling that [αεs − (1− α)εn] = 0 and consequently (εs + εn) = εs + α1−αεs = εs1−α , we
obtain:
·
bs,T = −
[
1
γs
+ 1
]
·
qs,T bs,0︸ ︷︷ ︸
stock
+
[
1− ψγs
γsφ
+
εs
φ(1− α) −
δ
γs
]
·
qs,T︸ ︷︷ ︸
flow
+
·
sn,T (13)
Expression (13) shows that the effect of real exchange rate depreciation on the debt dynamics
can be decomposed into a stock and a ﬂow component. Assuming γs = φ = 1 and εs = δ  0.5,
given that (1−α) < 1 the ﬂow component will typically be positive, suggesting that in the absence of
debt stock ﬁscal retrenchment geared to competitiveness adjustment improves the debt dynamics
(unless we assume a signiﬁcant expansion in the North, which is not in the cards).
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The stock component - that represents the negative effect of domestic disinﬂation on the out-
standing stock of debt - is always worsening the debt dynamics. In a country that has independent
monetary policy, the effect of ﬁscal retrenchment on prices could be at least partially offset by the
monetary policy, but this is not the case in this scenario, because monetary policy is assumed
to be targeting inﬂation in the North. The overall effect of the stock and ﬂow component is not
immediately evident and the derivative with respect to
·
qs,T has an ambiguous sign:
∂
∂
·
qs,T
= −
[
1
γs
+ 1
]
bs,0 +
[
1− ψγs
γsφ
+
εs
φ(1− α)
]
− δ
γs
≷ 0
For competitiveness adjustment (
·
qs,T < 0) to improve the debt dynamics we need ∂
∂
·
qs,T
> 0
which translates into a condition on the initial level of debt :
bs,0 <
γs
1 + γs
[
1− ψγs
γsφ
+
εs
φ(1− α) −
δ
γs
]
= b̂s,0 (14)
Expression (14) tells us that that there exists a threshold level of bs,0 that determines the out-
come of competitiveness adjustment on the debt dynamics. For any initial level of debt larger than
b̂s,0, the real exchange adjustment (no matter what its size is) worsen the debt dynamics. For all
initial debt level lower than b̂s,0, the opposite holds.
In the second scenario, substituting
·
ss,T from (10) into the debt dynamics and recalling that
·
ps,T = (1− α) ·qs,T we get:
·
bs,T = −
[
1
γs
+ 1
]
(1− α) bs,0 ·qs,T +
[
(1− α) (1− ψγs) + γsεs
γsφ (1− α) −
δ
γs
(1− α)
]
·
qs,T +
·
sn,T (15)
A ﬁrst thing to notice id that the component of the stock and ﬂow term where depreciation
worsen the debt dynamics is smaller here than in (12) as (1 − α) < 1. The sign of the derivative
with respect to
·
qs,T again is undecided:
∂
∂
·
qs,T
= −
[
1
γs
+ 1
]
(1− α) bs,0 +
[
(1− α) (1− ψγs) + γsεs
γsφ (1− α) −
δ
γs
(1− α)
]
≷ 0
and again ∂
∂
·
qs,T
> 0 translates into a condition on the initial debt level:
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bs,0 <
1
1− α︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
γs
1 + γs
[
(1− α) (1− ψγs) + γsεs
γsφ (1− α) −
δ
γs
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
̂bs,0
+
δ
1 + γs
α
1− α︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
= b˜s,0 (16)
Given that 11−α > 1 and
δ
1+γs
α
1−α > 0, the debt threshold found in (16) is higher than the debt
threshld found in (14): b˜s,0 > b̂s,0 In the second scenario - with appreciation through inﬂation in
the North - competitiveness adjustment is beneﬁcial to the debt dynamics at a higher initial level of
debt. This means that for all those countries whose initial debt level satisﬁes bs,0 ∈ (̂bs,0; b˜s,0), the
real exchange rate adjustment improve the debt dynamics rather than worsen it.
3.4 Numerical calibration
To have an idea of the order of magnitude of the two debt thresholds, we calibrate the parameters
in equations (14) and (16) on the basis of available model simulations. Our basis for the calibration
is the extensive comparison recently produced by major international institutions (Coenen et al.
2012). We focus on a two-year horizon to leave time for price-quantity interactions to set in. We
set the following values fo the parameters:
• α, the share of the South in total GDP of the area (based on actual data), is set at 0.35
• ψ, the responsiveness of output to the interest rate, is set at 0.5 (Coenen et al. 2012)
• δ, the sensitivity of the deﬁcit to output, is set at 0.5 following EC (2005)
• φ, the ﬁscal multiplier, is set at 1, following Coenen et al (Coenen et al. 2012)
We allow for different values of the Phillips curve coefﬁcient (γ) and the elasticity of output to
the real exchange rates (εs). This results in two cases:
• High price responsiveness - low output responsiveness, with γ = 0.75 and εs = 0.1
• Low price responsiveness - high output responsiveness, with γ = 0.25 and εs = 0.3
The values for γ come again from recent estimates (Coenen et al. 2012) and the calibration of
ε is based on simulations of exchange arte shocks performed by OECD (OECD 2010).
In the ﬁrst case we ﬁnd that both debt thresholds (14) and (16) are very low: 14% of GDP if
monetary policy targets price stability in the North and 37% of GDP if the target is price stability
for the area as a whole.
In the second case, with low price responsiveness and high output responsiveness, the threscholds
increase considerably to 39% of GDP and to 82% of GDP respectively. This simple calibration does
not pretend to fulﬁll empirical accuracy but it is aimed at suggesting orders of magnitude for the
debt thresholds that are close to actual observations.
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3.5 The effect of structural reforms
Structural reforms are often regarded as key to improving both competitiveness and growth thereby
impacting the budgetary equation also. Here we focus on the effect of increasing γ, the coefﬁcient
of the Phillips curve. A change in γ can be interpreted as the effect of structural labour and product
market reforms, aiming at improvements. It is therefore interesting to study the derivative of the
debt dynamics with respect to it.
Under the ﬁrst scenario, the derivative of the debt dynamics with respect to γs yields:
∂
·
bs,T
∂γs
=
{
1
γ2s
·
qs,T bs,0 − 1
γ2sφ
·
qs,T +
δ
γ2s
·
qs,T
}
≷ 0
bs,0 =
1− δφ
φ
(17)
This debt level is apparently different from the one in (14). However, ∂/∂γs = 0 means that
the level of debt found here is the particular one at which γs is neutral to the debt dynamics.
Therefore substituting γs = 0 in equation (14) we obtain exactly the same expression. For any
debt level smaller than (17), the derivative is negative, meaning that structural reforms (increasing
γs) improve the debt dynamics.
The same exercise can be done assuming we are in the second scenario. In this case the
derivative of the debt dynamics with respect ot γs becomes:
∂
·
bs,T
∂γs
=
{
1
γ2s
(1− α) ·qs,T bs,0 − 1
γ2sφ
·
qs,T +
δ
γ2s
(1− α) ·qs,T
}
≷ 0
And the corresponding debt threshold (corresponding to the one found in (15) provided that γs
is set to zero):
bs,0 =
1− δφ (1− α)
φ (1− α) (18)
Again, for all levels of debt below the threshold, structural reform improve the debt dynamics
whereas the opposite holds for initial debt levels larger than the threshold. The limit debt level
found in (18) is larger than the one found in the case of no inﬂation in the North. This suggests that
inﬂation in the North has a second positive effect, namely to render structural reform beneﬁcial for
the debt dynamics at higher level of debt.
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4 Conclusions
Our analysis suggests a number of interesting results.
• The current policy assignment in the euro area can be summarized as one in which the com-
petitive North aims at restoring ﬁscal sustainability through budgetary consolidation whereas
the uncompetitive South uses budgetary retrenchment to restore both sustainability and com-
petitiveness;
• Indeed, the differential ﬁscal stance between North and South is what determines real ex-
change rate changes. South therefore needs to tighten more than North to regain competi-
tiveness. There is no escape from relative austerity.
• In a scenario where monetary policy aims at keeping inﬂation stable in the North, competi-
tiveness improvement in the South implies very low inﬂation or deﬂation. This worsens the
debt dynamics. We ﬁnd that if the initial debt is above a certain threshold, debt dynamics is
even perverse: ﬁscal retrenchment is self-defeating;
• If monetary policy targets average inﬂation instead, which implies higher inﬂation in the North
for any given real exchange rate adjustment, the debt dynamics turns more favourable and
the initial debt threshold above which it becomes perverse is higher. Accepting more inﬂation
at home is therefore a way for the North to contribute to restoring debt sustainability in the
South.
• Structural reforms in the South improve the debt dynamics if the initial debt is not too high.
Again, targeting average inﬂation rather than inﬂation in the North helps strengthen the
favourable effects of structural reforms.
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